Tuesday, March 27, 2007

An Argument Against Tooley's Dynamic View of Time

**WARNING: Technical Post**

1. Either States of Affairs (SAFs) are in time or SAFs are not in time.
2. Something cannot be located in a time other than that of its material constituents when they are arranged in such a way to give rise to that thing.
3. So by 2, if SAFs are in time, then SAFs cannot be located in a time other than that of its material constituents when they are arranged in such a way to give rise to that SAF.
4. For some SAFs, the time when their material constituents are arranged in such a way to give rise to them is wholly located in the past.
5. So by 3 and 4, if SAFs are in time, then some SAFs are wholly located in the past.
6. An SAF is actual-in-the-present if and only if it exists in the present.
7. Something exists in the present if and only if it is located in the present.
8. Something is wholly located in the past only if it is not located in the present.
9. So by 5-8, if SAFs are in time then some SAFs are wholly located in the past but not actual-in-the-present.
10. If some SAFs are wholly located in the past but not actual-in-the-present then Tooley's Dynamic View of Time (TDVT) is false.
11. So by 9 and 10, if SAFs are in time then TDVT is false.
12. By 6, and 7, if SAFs are not in time, no SAF is actual-in-the-present.
13. If no SAF is actual-in-the-present, then TDVT is false.
14. So by 1, 11 and 13, TDVT is false.

2 comments:

Taylor Adams said...

Why premise 2?

How could spacetime exist if there's nothing within it which could have caused it?

Ian and Gilda said...

Taylor, I'm not sure you're understanding premise 2. I'm also not sure about the idea of something within spacetime causing spacetime. But I don't see how that would have anything to do with premise 2. Note that by "give rise to" I didn't mean this in a causal sense but rather in a constitutive or similar metaphysical or mereological sense.